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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

)

)

Plaintiff-Respondent, )
)

vs.

) Case No.

ANDREW GEORGE KISH,
a./k/a WILLIAM WALTER
SNYDER
I

Defendant-Appellant.

)

)
)

13004

)

)

)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

I. ISSUES
1.

Failure to Appoint Separate

Counsel for Appellant.
2.

More Severe Sentence Imposed

Upon Appellant Because He Demanded His
Constitutional Right to a Jury Trial.
3.

Failure of

Cour~

to Categori-

cally Exclude for all Purposes an
Improperly Obtained Statement Allegedly

2

Made

_ey

Appellant.

4.

Failure of Prosecutor to Indorse

Witnesses Upon the Information and to
Indorse the Names of Other Witnesses
Upon the Information Until the Morning
of Trial.
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II. STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The Defendant, Andrew George Kish,
also known as William Walter Snyder,
hereinafter referred to as "Kish" or
"Appellant", was arrested with two other
men, Charles William Morris and Lloyd
Plaz Vincent, Jr., and charged with
"Attempt to Commit the Crime of Robbery
with a Deadly Weapon".

The charge was

subsequently amended to read "Assault
with Intent to Commit Robbery".
III. DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The two other defendants pled guilty
to a lesser charge and Defendant, Kish,
after trial before a jury, was found
guilty of said charge and sentenced to
a term of five

(S)

years to life.

T
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IV. RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of his
conviction.
V. STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Defendant, Andrew Kish was
arrested in an automobile

(TR. p. 881,

1,12) on the 4th of February 1972

(TR.

p. 86, L. 17) along with two other men,
Charles William Morris and Lloyd Plaz
Vincent

(TR. p. 88, 11. 18-20).

There

were also two females in the car when
Defendant was arrested

(TR. p. 87, 11.

23), neither of whom were ever identified during the trial.
A prosecuting witness, Albert Dean
Stock, testified that at approximately
3:00 a.m. of the morning of February 4,
1972, an automobile in which he saw only
three occupants, drove into his Chevron

T
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Station and asked for gasoline, that he
filled the tank and was presented with
an American Oil Credit Card.

The Wit-

ness testified that though American Oil
Credit Cards were often mistakenly given
to him, and were acceptable by Chevron
Dealers in some states, he could not
accept the card.

When the driver indica-

ted he did not have cash, the Witness
stated

~e

suggested they wait until the

American Oil Station across the street
opened and that he was sure he could
clear the charge through their machine.
That would be a three or four hour wait.
The Witness testified that the car
pulled to a parking spot, that the car
was in bad shape and it was cold and he
hated to see them have to run the car
to keep warm, so suggested they move it
into the Service Station Bay.

Sometime

later three men came from the Bay, one

I
'

I

I

I
t

I
I
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carrying a knife, robbed him, tied him
up and departed after rifling the money
box.

Moments later he loosened himself

and contacted the police and sometime
thereafter Appellant, Vincent and Morris
and two girls were arrested in an automobile on Highway I-15 East and North
St. George.

~f

(TR. pp. 23-32)

Appellant, Kish, was taken to St.
George, Washington

C~unty

by the arresting officers.

Police Station
There a

statement was taken from Kish by officer
Jerry Sandburg of the St. George Police
Department (TR. Hearing held March 17,
1972, p. 41 Et. Seq.)
Subsequently Jim R. Scarth, Esq. was
appointed to represent Charles William
Morris

(Preliminary Hearing TR. p. 4, 11.

10-11) and Darwin C. Fisher, Esq., was
appointed to represent the Defendants
Lloyd Plaz Vincent, Jr., and Appellant,
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Kish

(Preliminary Hearing TR. p. 4, 11.

16-17).

A Preliminary Hearing was held on
the 10th day of February, 1972 in the
District Courtroom at St. George, Utah
(Preliminary Hearing TR.)

The co-

defendant Charles William Morris was 17
years of age and had only turned 17 a
few days before the Preliminary Hearing
was held.

(Pre 1 iminary Hearing TR. pp.

6, 11, 8-10).
Ultimately J. MacArthur Wright,
Esq., was substituted as attorney in the
place of Fisher, Esq., for Kish, the
Appellant herein, and for Lloyd Plaz
Vincent, Jr., co-defendant, in the proceedings below.
Subsequent to the Preliminary
Hearing, various motions were filed on
behalf of the three co-defendants
including the Appellant herein, including
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a Motion to Substitute Counsel on behalf
of the Appellant, Kish, and a Motion to
Suppress certain evidence on behalf of
all three of the co-defendants,Morris,
Vincent and the Appellant, Kish.

(TR.

dated March 17, 1972)
With respect to the Motion to Substitute Counsel, the Court severed the
case for trial between the Defendant
Vincent represented by counsel J.
MacArthur Wright, Esq., and Appellant,
Kish, also represented by the same counsel, and denied the Motion to Substitute
Counse 1 (TR. dated March 1 7, 1972, p.
11.

l~

6-7).

However, the Motion to Substitute
Counsel was renewed by Counsel for the
Appellant, Kish, on the morning of the
trial, March 20,

1972, in Chambers, when

it was indicated for the first time that
the co-defendant, Vincent, would be
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called as a witness on behalf of the
State against the Appellant, Kish.

(TR.

p. 14, 1.30 and pp. 15, 11, 1-22).
During all times pertinent hereto,
the undersigned Counsel represented both
the co-defendant, Vincent, and Appellant,
Kish.

During the times after his assuming

the defense of the said two co-defendants,
Vincent and Kish, said Counsel engaged in
a series of negotiations with the County
Attorney of Washington County and the
District Attorney, representing the State
of Utah, with the intent of obtaining an
agreement with the State whereby one or
both of the Defendants might plead guilty
to a lesser charge than that then currently lodged against them.
The co-defendant, Vincent, did subsequently plead to a lesser charge (see

TR. dated March 17, 1972, p. 12, 1.14 and
p. 13, 1.7)
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At the same time that these negotiations
were going on, Counsel was also negotiating with Counsel for the State in an
attempt to obtain from him a recommendation t~ the Court that, upon a plea of
guilty by the co-defendant, Vincent, the
sentence would be suspended pending, and
for the sole purpose of permitting
authorities from the State of Kentucky,
from which State the Defendant, Vincent,
was wanted as a parole violator to come
and return Vincent to the State Reformatory of that State.

Ultimately such a

recommendation was made by the District
Attorney, and a similar request was made
by Counsel for

the co-defendant, Vincent,

to the Court.

Thereafter the Court did

suspend the sentence of Defendant, Lloyd
Plaz Vincent, Jr., conditioned upon the
authorities from the State of Kentucky
coming after the said Vincent and
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returning him to Kentucky to serve the
balance of his term in the Kentucky
State Reformatory.
At the same time, Counsel for
Appellant, Kish, had informed him of the
possibility that a similar reduction could
probably be obtained on his behalf in
exchange for an agreement to plead guilty
to said lesser charge if he so desired to
do so.

(TR. March 17, 1972 p. 3, 1.13 to

p. 4 1.1).

Out of these negotiations by Counsel

on behalf of the co-defendant Vincent and
the Appellant, Kish, arose the Petition
for Appointment of Separate Counsel by
Appellant as reflected in the hearing
held March 17, 1972

(See TR. March 17,

1972, p. 2 to p. 4).
On March 20, 1972 co-defendant
Vincent did plead guilty to a lesser
charge, Assault with a Deadly Weapon and
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the Appellant, Kish, was scheduled for
trial before a jury on the charge of
Assault with Intent to Commit Robbery.
On that same day prior to the convening
of the jury for the trial of the Appellant, Kish, the Court ruled on the
Motions to Suppress Evidence which had
been previously filed and argued before
the Court, denying the same as to all
items except an alleged statement taken
from Appellant, Kish, on the morning of
his arrest at the police station in the
City of St. George.
p. 5, 1.6).

(TR. p. 2, 1.21-

At the time, however, the

Court stated that the statement which it
had ruled inadmissible, might be used for
impeachment purposes in the event the
Appellant, Kish, were to take the stand
in his own behalf.
L.

1) .

(TR. p. 4, 1.25-p. 5,
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Thereafter on the same morning
after the jury had been examined and
qualified and sworn, the Court granted
the motion of the State's Attorney to
permit the filing of an amended information in the matter against the
Appellant, Kish.

At that time it was

learned by the Counsel for Appellant
and the Appellant, himself, that witnesses were intended to be called by the
State who had not been indorsed on the
Amended Information nor any of the previous informations that had been filed
by the State's Attorney in the case prior

thereto.

(TR. p. 12, 1 13- p. 14, 1.19)

Objection was made to the filing of the
Amended Information without the indorsernent of all witnesses to be called by
the State upon it, and the Court granted
the Motion of Appellant's Counsel to have
all such witnesses indorsed upon said
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Amended Information.

At that point in

time, it was learned by the Appellant
and his Counsel that the State intended
to call as a witness against the Appellant, the co-defendant, Lloyd Plaz
Vincent, Jr.

(TR. p. 14, 11.20-25}.

Thereupon Counsel for the Appellant
renewed his objection to the Court's
failure to appoint separate counsel for
the Appellant, Kish, based upon the fact
that Counsel was in fact representing the
co-defendant, Vincent, whom it was now
learned was possibly going to be called
as a witness for the State, and a Motion
for Mistrial was made by Counsel for the
Appellant.

(TR. p. 15, 1, 10-12}.

The Court denied the Motion for a
Mistrial on the grounds that the codefendant, Lloyd Plaz Vincent, Jr., had
not yet and may not actually be called,
even though he was indorsed, as a witness
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by the State, upon the Amended Information.
The Appellant, Kish, thereupon
plead not guilty to the Amended Information

(TR. p. 19, 11.27-28) and the trial

on the charge was immediately thereafter
held.

The Appellant called only one

witness in his defense, Albert D. Stock,
as an adverse witness, who had previously
been called as a witness for the State.
(TR. p. 154, L. 13), and did not take the
stand himself,

(TR. p. 164, 1.26 - p.

165, 1.9)

At the conclusion of the trial, the
Appellant was found guilty by the jury
and a verdict of guilty was ordered by
the Court.

(TR. p. 173, 11.22-24).

On April 19, 1972, the Appellant was
sentenced to incarceration in the Utah
State Penitentiary for a period of time
not less than five years and which may
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be for 1 i fe.

(Sentencing Transcript, dated

April 19, 1972, p. 6, 11.19-22).
VI. ARGUMENT
1.

Failure to Substitute Separate

Counsel for Appellant.
The Appellant, Andrew George Kish
and co-defendant Lloyd Plaz Vincent, Jr.,
having both been arrested and charged
with the crime of Assault with a Deadly
Weapon with the Intent to Commit Robbery,
being indigent and unable to afford to
hire Counsel, were appointed Counsel by
the ccimmitting magistrate of Washington
County.

The Counsel appointed was

appointed for both Defendants.
A series of negotiations were initiated by Counsel for Appellant and his
co-defendant with the State's Attorney.
At the onset, a slight difference
in the goals of the two co-defendants
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existed.

Vincent, was, regardless of

disposition of charges here, a parole
violator from the State of Kentucky and
he soon made it evident to his Counsel
that it would be his desire to be sent
back to Kentucky, even though he would
have to be reincarcerated there, primarily because he would be closer to
his family and friends and hoped that
the prison environment there would be
more conducive to his rehabilitation
than being incarcerated such a long
distance from his family and others
interested in his welfare in the State
of Utah.
The Appellant, Kish, had no such
motivation, and in fact insisted upon
his innocence of the charges filed
against him.
Counsel, while engaged in negotiations with the State's Attorney, was
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faced with the implication that an agreement to accept a plea on a lesser charge
by the Defendant, Vincent, might be
accepted only if both co-defendants
agreed to do the same.

Though this

turned out not to be the case, it was a
constant consideration in the mind of
Counsel in his attempt to make the desired arrangements on behalf of his
client, Vincent.
At the same time, Counsel in his
attempt, to adequately and to the best
of his ability, represent the Appellant,
in a trial of the matter which became
necessary when the Appellant desired not
to enter a plea of guilty even to a
lesser charge and to assert his innocence of the charges filed against him,
was still faced with the necessity of
avoiding upsetting the delicate negotiations involving his second client,
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Vincent.

Therefore, that consideration

inevitably loomed, in Counsel's mind,
in his dealing with his client, Kish.
Furthermore, when Counsel's efforts
on behalf of Vincent, were close to
fruition, additional complications
entered the picture, when, it became
apparent that, after a plea of guilty to
a lesser charge by co-defendant, Vincent,
the State's Attorney, previously unbeknown to Appellant's Counsel, intended
to call said co-defendant, Vincent, as
a witness against the Appellant, Kish.
Even though, at that point, an
agreement had been reached whereby
Vincent would be allowed to plead to a
lesser charge, there still remained the
question of whether or not a suspended
sentence would be granted to him whereby
he might be returned to the State of
Kentucky and reincarcerated in the
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Reformatory in that State, closer to his
home, family and friends, rather than in
Utah.

That issue still remained to be

resolved and obviously would not be for
several days after the trial of the
Appellant, Kish, who was scheduled to go
on trial the morning of the day in which
Vincent was to plead guilty to the lesser
charge.
At this point Counsel for both codefendants was plagued with an additional
dilemma.

If Vincent were placed on the

witness stand, either by the State or by
the Appellant, Kish, and if there were
an attempt by the Appellant, Kish, to
cast the blame or the major responsibility for the alleged offense upon the
co-defendant, Vincent, as would be the
logical tactic under the facts as related
to Counsel by Kish.

Counsel would be

faced with the position of attacking one

21
client for the benefit of another client

I

an untenable position under any circumstance.

Furthermore, such a course of

conduct on behalf of the Appellant, Kish,
might easily have upset the delicate
balance of negotiations and the chance of
obtaining a suspended sentence for and on
behalf of co-defendant, Vincent.
Even though Appellant, Kish, through
his Counsel, did in fact express objection
to the placing of Vincent upon the witness
stand during his trial, it nevertheless,
under other circumstances might have been
to Kish's advantage to call Vincent to
the stand where his Counsel might have
the opportunity to engage in a probing
and incisive cross-examination of
Vincent had Kish have had independent
Counsel.
Because of the dilemma that Counsel
for both co-defendants found himself in,
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the decision, after discussion with
Kish, was made to try to avoid having
Vincent placed upon the stand as a witness, partly because of the conflict,
and partly because of the threat that
if Vincent took the stand and chose to
attempt to enhance his chances for a
suspended sentence by testimony he considered favorable to the State's case,
the Appellant would certainly then have
to take the witness stand himself and
rebut such implication of the co-defendant, Vincent, and Kish would then be
faced with the threat of having the
previously suppressed statement admitted
to impeach him as will be more fully
explored in Section 3 below.
In Commonwealth v Wheeler, 281 A.
2d 846, 444 Pa. 164, on page 847, is
found the following statement,
"It is axiomatic Constitutional
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Law that the Sixth Amendment
Guarantee of effective assistance of counsel requires inter
alia, that an attorney representing multiple defendants not
be faced with conflict of
interest.
'In Whitling we reversed the
Supreme Court, which had placed
the burden on the accused to
demonstrate that ineffective
representation was a consequence
of the conflict of interest, and
pertinently stated,
if in the
representation of more than one
defendant, a conflict of interest
arises, the mere existence of
such conflict vitiates the proceedings even though no actual
harm results.
The potentiality
that such harm may result rather
than that such harm did result,
furnishes the appropriate
criterion. 1 "
(emphasis added).
The Appellant herein believes that
that statement of the law most precisely
fits the situation that developed in the
proceedings prior to and during the trial
in the District Court below in this case.
While both the Appellant, himself, and
his Counsel moved to have separate counsel appointed, said motion was denied by
the District Court and Counsel was faced
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with the potential conflict of interest.
Counsel, even in his explanation to
the Court, below, of the potential conflict was faced with the further concern,
in arguing for the Motion to Appoint
Separate Counsel, that until he knew his
loyalty would be to only one or the other
of the two men he now represented, he
could not say anything to the Court, in
support of the Motion to Appoint Separate
Counsel, that might in fact be harmful or
deleterious to the cases of one or the
other of his two clients.
Therefore, Counsel though certainly
not desiring to withhold information from
the Court, was unable to argue and
expound upon the reasons for the appointment of a separate counsel for the
Appellant, Kish, as freely and candidly
as he might have done had he not also
had to bear in mind the interests of his
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other client, Mr. Vincent.
In People v Ramsey 95 Cal. Rptr.
231 on page 233 is found this enlightening statement,
"In examining the record we
look not only for manifestations of actual conflict, but
for areas of potential conflict.
This is because the
appointment of a single counsel
may mask the conflict between
co-defendants and it makes no
difference whether the conflicts
may have been apparent to the
participants at the time of the
trial or not."
(emphasis added)
In the present case, Appellant confided to his Counsel that he had been
picked up, as a hitchhiker, a few days
before, by the other four occupants of
the car, and that on the night in
question, he had been sleeping in the
automobile when it was pulled into the
service station garage to help keep the
occupants warm while they waited for a
service station across the street to
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open.
He further stated that he was
awakened out of a deep sleep and while
still partly groggy from sleep was led
into the office portion of the service
station by the other two male occupants
of the automobile, where he first fully
realized that one of his companions had
a knife and the purpose of the sally
into the station office was to rob the
attendant.

He stated to Counsel that he

yelled at the other two to put the knife
away and to stop, but that it was apparent by that time that things had already
gone too far and that the scheme hatched
by the other two men in the car could,

or would not be halted.

Kish, having

no funds of his own, no transportation
and alone in the middle of a winter's
night in a strange town, felt at that
moment, rightly or wrongly, that he had
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no choice but to remain with his companions and take a chance on getting out
of town with them.
That story was never told and does
not appear anywhere in the record and
whether it was true or whether it would
have been believed by the jury were it
told, will never be known.

Kish reported

at various times to his Counsel that his
co-defendants, prior to the trial sometimes indicated willingness to verify
his story and at other times indicated
that they would not.
Without the freedom to actively and
vig~rously

cross-examine co-defendants,

and with the threat of a statement being
used against him, which had been obtained
while Kish was unrepresented, without
proper advice as to its ramifications
and while he was plunged in virtual mental
incapacity by the fear, despair and
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confusion brought on by the night's
events, and which was found by the Court
to be sufficiently tainted as to be
inadmissible, Kish was trapped into
being unable to fully, completely lay
before the jury his defense.
The Court attempted to resolve the
conflict by severing the cases of the two
defendants and giving separate numbers to
the cases involving the co-defendant,
Lloyd Plaz Vincent, Jr., and the Defendant, Andrew George Kish.

However, the

court in Commonwealth v Booker, 280 A.2d
561 stated that where dual representation
continued throughout the trial, the conflict of interest was not cured by
granting a severance.
In the instant case it may be
argued that because one Defendant either
had agreed to or had plead guilty, prior
to the trial of the Appellant, that the
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question of the conflict is less important than it might otherwise be.
However, in Commonwealth v Shank 281 A.
2d 746 the Appellant there, was
sentenced immediately after testifying
for his co-defendant and assuming much
of the blame.

In that case he was rep-

resented by the same attorney who
represented the co-defendant for whom
he had testified.

There, like here, the

Appellant in that case, had also plead
guilty earlier to the charge as did the
co-defendant, Vincent, here, whom it
must be remembered, was still Counsel's
client.

He was granted a severe penalty

and the Court held that the conflict of
interest in the same attorney representing both defendants was too great to
overlook and that the potentiality that
harm might result from joint representation by Counsel rather than that such
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harm did actually result furnishes the
appropriate criterion for determining
whether there was a conflict of interest
prejudicial to the Defendant.
In this case, the Appellant, Kish,
argues that the precise situation existed,
in that the potentiality for conflict did
in fact exist and that therefore the proceedings should be wiped clean from the
slate and the Appellant's conviction
should be reversed.
The writer of this brief, who was
also Kish's Counsel in the trial below,
wishes to state that he made a sincere
and desperate attempt to be fair to all
concerned in the trial below, to the
Court, and to his two clients, and that
only after lengthy reflection has the
full impact of the ramifications of the
untenable position in which Counsel and
Appellant were placed during the trial

--
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and the prior negotiations, become
apparent to the writer.
2.

More Severe Sentence Imposed

Upon Appellant Because He Demanded His
Constitutional Right to a Jury Trial
The Appellant, because he insisted
upon his innocence and required a jury
trial, a right all are entitled to who
are accused of committing a crime, under
the American system of justice, ended up
with a harsher penalty than did his codefendants in this case.

It is hardly

equitable that one who insists upon his
constitutional rights must be penalized
for doing so.

This is most true when

two or more are arrested for the same
crime and under identical circumstances,
but one finally ends up with the harsher
penalty than do the others.
Courts have condemned policies
which require that one, insisting upon
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his rights, be punished more severely
if he is nevertheless found guilty,
than one who decides not to take the
chance and pleads guilty to a lesser
charge.

See: Gillespie v State, 355

p. 2d 451; and United States v Wiley
267 F. 2d 453.
It is easy to see the potential
abuse which can come to the rights of
defendants when such an unhappy result
occurs to him who asks for a trial.
In the present case, the Appellant,
Kish, believed his involvement was
different than and less culpable than
those with whom he was arrested and
demanded a trial, even though his companions accepted an opportunity to
plead to lesser charges, and as a result
ended up with the harshest sentence of
all!
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There is no evidence that his guilt
was greater than the others, so that
though his unhappy plight came about as
a result of a common practice, in the
field of criminal prosecution and defense-Plea Bargaining--the result in this case
was a most unfortunate miscarriage of
justice insofar as Appellant was concerned.
3.

Failure !2_y Court to Categori-

cally Exclude, for all Purposes, an
Improperly Obtained Statement Allegedly
Made l2.y_ Appellant
The Appellant, Andrew Kish, moved,
prior to trial, for the exclusion of an
alleged statement taken from him by
certain arresting officers during
the morning of his arrest.

The Court,

after taking testimony determined that
the statement was improperly obtained
from the Appellant and that it was not
admissible.

Had the Court gone no further,
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the Appellant would have no quarrel on
this point; however, the Court, upon
the insistance of the Prosecuting Attorney,
went further, and, in the opinion of the
Appellant, totally destroyed the affect
of the suppression of the statement, by
making this statement,
"Now, I am not ruling on that, Mr.
Wright, (whether or not the statement would be admissible for the
purpose of impeaching the Defendant, Andrew Kish, in the event he
were to take the stand in his own
defense) and I think you should
know that in the event the Defendant, William Walter Snyder,
(Andrew George Kish) gets on the
witness stand it may be that upon
a proper presentation the District
Attorney can use that for impeachment purposes and you may stand
forewarned of that fact."
(emphasis added)
(TR. p. 4 1 253 0) •

Though the Court did mitigate the
effect of the statement to a certain
extent by stating that the,

" .•. statement

may, upon proper presentation be used for
impeachment purposes," the possibility
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was distinctly presented to the Appellant
and his Counsel that a statement which
was otherwise

fou~d

to be improperly ob-

tained and therefore should be suppressed
might resurface--be resurrected--at a
point when it could and would cause
possibly far more damage to the Defendant
than if it had been initially admitted.
Vfuether a Defendant should take the
stand in a criminal case is always a
decision of great significance and involves one of the most sensitive decisions
to be made by the Defendant and his
Counsel.

Regardless of the innocence of

a particular Defendant, because of
foreign and alien factors and other reasons totally unrelated to his guilt or
innocence,

to take the witness stand and

submit to cross-examination may do more
to convict a man than all other evidence
presented.

By the same token, a good
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presentation as a witness, might have
the opposite effect.
Whatever might have been the effect,
however, of the Appellant appearing as a
witness in his own defense, it might have
been completely nullified or discredited
by the use of a statement which had previously been ruled to have been improperly
obtained and inadmissible in the trial.
The use of the word "forewarned" by
the Court in stating to Appellant and his
Counsel that the statement might be used
if he were to take the stand, could only
inhibit him and greatly influence the
decision by him and his Counsel whether
he should or should not take the stand
and testify.

It would appear axirnnatic

if the statement were tainted to the
extent that it is inadmissible for one
purpose it would be inadmissible for the
purpose suggested by the Court, that is,
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as

an impeachment weapon by the State.
In People v Byrd 266 p2d 505, 42C

2d 200 Cert. Denied 75 S.Ct. 73, 348

U. S. 848, 99 L. Ed. 2d 668, the Court
on page 510 stated,

"The portion of Defendant's
argument which is directed to
the point that an involuntary
confession may not be used
either for the purpose of
proving the crime confessed or
for the purpose of impeaching
the Defendant is sustained by
authority."
Even though the question of whether
to put a Defendant on the stand in his
own defense is a delicate question, it
is well within common knowledge that in

most cases it is to the distinct disadvantage of the Defendant if he does not
take the stand in the eyes of a jury of
laymen, and any such external factors
such as the warning involved in this
case should not be imposed upon the
Defendant or his Counsel in making that
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important decision.
Furthermore, in this case, the
decision to take the stand or not to
take the stand, was influenced not only
by the warning by the Court, concerning
the previously suppressed statement, but
also by the implied threat that if the
Appellant, Kish, were to take the witness stand, the co-defendant, Vincent,
who had already plead guilty to a lesser
charge, would be called as a witness for
the State and Appellant and his Counsel
would be again confronted with the dilemma
of the dual representation by Counsel, all
of which served, cumulatively, to discourage the Appellant, Kish, from taking
the witness stand in his own behalf.
In People v Speaks 319 p. 2d 709,
156 C.A.2d 25, the Court after a lengthy
explication of the fact situation, said
on page 715,
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"Procedure similar to that
followed in the present case-introducing the alleged confession by way of impeachment
and by way of rebuttal, without
proof that it was voluntary-was condemned in People v
Rodrigues 58 Cal. Ap. 2d 415,
at page 418, 136 P2d 626, at
page 628 at which this court
said:
'The alleged confession
to Officer Story was not offered
as a part of the People's case
in chief.
It was held back to be
offered in rebuttal and in the
guise of impeachment of Defendant
and after his denials upon crossexamination. Apparently both
Counsel and the Court considered
this to be a proper procedure.
Not only that, but it appears to
have been assumed that a confession
enlisted by way of impeachment was
admissible without proof that it
had been given voluntarily ...• it
was no more proper for the District
Attorney to offer the evidence as
rebuttal after the Defendant's
denial of the alleged statements,
under the pretense that it was
offered to impeach the Defendant,
than it would have been to offer
it in rebuttal if the Defendant
had not been questioned about it
at all."
In the present case, the alleged
statement was not in fact used.

But the

Court warned that it might be used, and
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in the opinion of the Appellant and
Appellant's Counsel, they could not
take the risk of the Appellant taking
the stand and testifying and then upon
the State's Attorney attempting to use
the statement in an exercise in impeachment, find that the Court would allow
the use of the tainted statement.

Con-

sequently the threat of using the statement was a serious inhibiting factor in
the decision whether or not Defendant
should take the stand in his own defense.
This statement by the Court clearly and
definitely taints the entire proceeding
and is justification for the reversal of
the conviction of Appellant.
3.

Failure of Prosecutor to Indorse

Witnesses Upon the Information and to
Indorse the Name of Other Witnesses Upon
the Information Until the Morning of
Trial
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Section 77-21-52 of the Utah Code
Annotated (1953) states as follows:
"When an information or indictment is filed, the names of all
the witnesses or deponents on
whose evidence information or
indictment was based shall be
indorsed thereon before, it is
presented, and the prosecuting
attorney shall indorse on the
information or indictment at such
time as the court may by rule, or
otherwise, prescribe the names of
such other witnesses as he purposes to call. A failure to so
indorse the said names shall not
affect the validity or sufficiency of the information or
indictment, but the court in
which the information or indictment was filed shall, upon
application of defendant, direct
the names of such witnesses to
be indorsed.
No continuance
shall be allowed because of the
failure to indorse any of the
said names unless such application
was made at the earliest opportunity and then only if a
continuance is necessary in the
interest of justice."
In the instant case when the Amended
Information was prepared and filed on the
morning of the trial, after the jury had
been qualified and sworn, in chambers,
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out of the presence of the jury, the said
Amended Information included the names
only of witnesses Albert Dean Stock,
Hyrum Ipson, Joseph Pfoutz and George
Anderson.

(TR. p.

12, 11.29-30).

Upon an inquiry being made by
Appellant's Counsel whether or not those
were the only witnesses to be called by
the State, the Prosecuting Attorney
advised that others would be called and
the Appellant objected that the names of
the additional witnesses had not been
indorsed upon the Information as required
by Section 77-21-52 of the Utah Code
Annotated (1953).

The Prosecuting Attorney

pointed out that other names had been
provided in a Bill of Particulars.

The

additional name provided there, was George
Lang.

(See Bill of Particulars, Para-

graph 1.)
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The Prosecuting Attorney then stated
that, in addition to those already mentioned, he wished to indorse upon the
Information at that late date the name
of Lloyd Plaz Vincent, Jr., the co-defendant in the proceedings before the Court.
(TR. p.

14, 11.20-21)

Also during the trial, the prosecution called as a witness, Joe Hutchings,
a witness who had never been indorsed
upon the Information or provided in the
Bill of Particulars.
Clearly these oversights or omissions,
until the last moment before the trial
cormnenced, or in the case of Joe Hutchings,
during the trial, place the Appellant
under an accumulating disadvantage when
considered in conjunction with the fact
that his Counsel had already been placed
in a position of conflict, and with the
fact that he, the Appellant, was faced
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with a coercive influence in making relevant and highly important decisions, due
to the warning by the Court that the
tainted statement might be admitted for
impeachment purposes.
Even though Section 71-2-52 states
that a failure to indorse the said names
shall not affect the validity or sufficiency of the Information or Indictment,
nevertheless, the statute is provided for
a purpose and that purpose is to permit
the Defendant to evaluate and consider
possible testimony and make plans for his
defense in advance and when that information is denied him, that purpose is
thwarted and an additional disadvantage
is heaped upon the Defendant's burden
which he must overcome in defending himself and obtaining justice.
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VII.CONCLUSION
Appellant strongly believes that
where he was forced to share defense
counsel, equally committed to representing a co-defendant with whom he had a
conflict, not only as to the evidence
concerning the alleged offense, but as
to goals he desired to achieve through
the court proceedings below, and where
his other co-defendants, arrested at the
same time, by pleading guilty to lesser
charges, and who were at least equally
involved if not more so, received lesser
sentences than he received by asserting
his claim to innocence, and where an
inadmissible statement was held over his
head in an improper and wrongful manner,
causing an adverse influence, upon
important and crucial defense decisions,
and finally, where the untimely
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indorsement of witnesses on the information and outright failure to indorse on
the information, one witness used by the
Prosecutor, that the rights of Appellant
have been so abused as to require in the
interests of justice that the Appellant's
conviction be reversed.
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